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Abstract
Knowledge of common events is central to many aspects of cognition. Intuitively, it seems as
though events are linear chains of the activities of which they are comprised. In line with this
intuition, a number of theories of the temporal structure of event knowledge have posited mental
representations (data structures) consisting of linear chains of activities. Competing theories focus
on the hierarchical nature of event knowledge, with representations comprising ordered scenes,
and chains of activities within those scenes. We present evidence that the temporal structure of
events typically is not well-defined, but it is much richer and more variable both within and across
events than has usually been assumed. We also present evidence that prediction-based neural net-
work models can learn these rich and variable event structures and produce behaviors that reflect
human performance. We conclude that knowledge of the temporal structure of events in the
human mind emerges as a consequence of prediction-based learning.
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1. Introduction
Theories of cognition have long sought to account for the ways in which human
knowledge is organized. Psychological constructs such as concept seem well suited for
many domains of knowledge. For example, the notion of concept is central to most
theories of people’s knowledge of entities such as cows, objects such as shoes, abstract
concepts such as attitude, and ad hoc categories such as things to take on a camping
trip (Barsalou, 1983; Murphy, 2002). For these domains, taxonomic, similarity, and
thematic relations have been central to theories of knowledge organization and class
inclusion.
However, humans also develop knowledge about regularities involving behavior and
events in the world. How do we go about doing things in our everyday lives? How
do we interpret the behavior of others? How do we anticipate what is likely to happen
next? When something happens, how do we interpret whether it is coincidental or it
reflects cause–effect relationships? Being able to answer such questions allows us to
anticipate the consequences of our own actions and those of others, and thus allows
us to make inferences about the possible goals or intentions that underlie those
actions.
The question of how the temporal dimension of events is represented in human mem-
ory has been an important subject of study for quite some time. Perhaps the first detailed
computational model of event knowledge was Minsky’s (1974) proposal of frames. Min-
sky defined a frame as.
a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation . . . attached to each frame are
several kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame.
Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these
expectations are not confirmed. (p. 1)
The very explicitness of frame-based models that made them attractive also exposed
their Achilles’ heel. It became apparent that frames suffered from significant limita-
tions. Most troubling was their brittleness and inflexibility. The restaurant script
described a canonical event, but this canonical event rarely if ever occurs because
there are a huge number of context-dependent variations. This challenge was recog-
nized from the start (Schank & Abelson, 1977), but the mechanisms that were devel-
oped to deal with the variation (e.g., Memory Organization Packets; Schank, 1980)
seemed not only post hoc, but also suffered from the same brittleness that created
their need in the first place.
Furthermore, none of these proposals addressed the question of how event knowledge
might be learned in the first place, or how and when event knowledge should be modified
as a result of experience (the Piagetian puzzle of when to accommodate and when to as-
similate). In our view, these and related problems reflect important intrinsic limitations of
the symbolic, digital architectures that had been used to implement frames and scripts.
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Although efforts to develop mechanistic accounts of event models did not entirely cease,
work in this area and appeals to schemas and event knowledge declined over time.
However, in the past number of years, event cognition has had a major resurgence.
Part of this effort has involved designing and implementing models that learn and use
knowledge about events in the service of segmenting the perceptual stream into events
(Reynolds, Zacks, & Braver, 2007), learning and processing information about the com-
ponents of events and their temporal structure (Elman & McRae, 2019), and understand-
ing language (Frank, Koppen, Noordman, & Vonk, 2003; Mayberry, Crocker, &
Knoeferle, 2009; Modi, 2016; Venhuizen et al., 2019). A central unifying aspect is that
many of these models are based on computational systems that feature prediction as piv-
otal to both learning and processing. This event-predictive cognition approach demon-
strates promise for overcoming important limitations that were inherent to models based
on symbolic data structures, and this approach has provided new and nuanced insights
into how event knowledge may be learned and used (Butz, Bilkey, Humaidan, Knott, &
Otte, 2019).
In Cognitive Science, a number of terms have been used to describe knowledge of
common events such as going to a restaurant. These include schema (Anderson, 1978;
Norman & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart, 1980), frame (Minsky, 1974), script (Abelson,
1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977), story (Mandler, 1984), and the related notion of situa-
tion model (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), among others. All of these models of human
knowledge are based on symbolic data structures that provide efficient abstractions over
many instances, or facilitate construction of new instances on the fly. In this article, we
use the term event knowledge to denote people’s knowledge of events and situations, rec-
ognizing that there is both considerable overlap in the types of knowledge captured by
these many terms, and multiple ways in which the various models associated with these
terms focus on different aspects of event knowledge.
It is important to clarify our terminology up front. Terminology in research on events
is somewhat confusing because the notion of “event” plays an important role in numerous
areas of Cognitive Science (event memory in cognitive psychology, linguistics, psycholin-
guistics, action and motor planning, and robotics, to name some of them). That is, the
goals of the research and researchers that feature “events” differ greatly across, for exam-
ple, linguistics, cognitive psychology, and computational models of action planning. This
creates a situation in which the “levels” of events, actions, and motor plans, as well as
how those levels are labeled, differ across areas and researchers. A researcher’s focus on
specific levels depends to a great extent on precisely what phenomena she is trying to
explain. Various researchers have used terms like event, activity, and action in different
ways. In this article, we use activity to refer to somewhat abstracted knowledge of what
roughly corresponds to an action, such as mix the ingredients with a spoon, and we use
event to refer to a series of activities, such as baking an apple pie. We recognize that
events, activities, and actions are grounded in sensorimotor experiences, and that under-
standing this grounding is an important aspect of research on events in Cognitive Science.
However, our article focuses on knowledge that resides at a somewhat more abstract
level.
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There are at least two major dimensions of activities and events. The first is the set of
components that make up an activity. Important components include agents, patients,
recipients, instruments, and contexts (which often correspond to locations). The second is
the temporal order in which a set of activities within an event unfolds. In this article, we
focus mainly on people’s knowledge of the temporal order of activities; that is, we
emphasize time.
There has been a great deal of research into how events are represented in the mind,
and this work goes back many years in the history of cognitive psychology (Bower,
Black, & Turner, 1979; Minsky, 1974; Schank & Abelson, 1977). As such, a number
of theories have been advanced regarding how event knowledge, including the time-
course of events, is represented in the mind. As pointed out by Elman (1995), all of
our behaviors unfold over time and time is the context within which we understand the
world. For example, a primary source of information that allows people to recognize
causality concerns the fact that causes typically precede effects. In fact, it is difficult to
think about phenomena such as language, action, goal-directed behavior, social behav-
ior, or planning without some way of representing time. A number of highly influential
and important theories of event knowledge dealt with time by creating prespecified tem-
plate-like data structures that were used to represent a sequence of activities (Abelson,
1981). That is, time was encoded representationally. Models such as those based on
scripts were relatively brittle and inflexible, and they did not address how event knowl-
edge is learned, although these limitations were acknowledged at the time. On the other
hand, Elman (1990) argued for a different approach in which time is represented
implicitly. He suggested that time should be represented by the effect that it has on
processing, rather than being encoded as links in memory, or as part of the input to a
model (e.g., a spatial representation of time, as in a shift register). This entails using a
model that has temporally dynamic properties that are responsive to temporal
sequences. In Elman’s simple recurrent network (SRN), the computational units (hid-
den) at time t serve as part of the input state at time t + 1. In addition, his model was
trained to predict what might come next given the current input. Thus, processing is
influenced both by the current input and the state of the system that resulted from the
previous string of inputs. In other words, the system instantiates a temporally sensitive
memory that allows it to encode the temporal properties of sequential input because the
internal representations are influenced by temporal context, with the effect of time
being implicit in the model’s internal states.
The main goal of this article is to argue that knowledge of the temporal structure of
events in the human mind emerges as a consequence of prediction-based learning and
processing. In fact, a number of recent theories that focus on event segmentation, event
knowledge, and event-based language comprehension have been implemented using mod-
els that process through time and/or have temporally sensitive memory (Botvinick &
Plaut, 2004; Elman & McRae, 2019; Modi, 2016; Reynolds, Zacks, & Braver, 2007;
Takac & Knott, 2016a, 2016b; Venhuizen, Crocker, & Brouwer, 2019). We discuss these
models, with a particular focus on Elman and McRae’s connectionist attractor model of
event knowledge.
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1.1. The temporal nature of events
Intuitively, it feels as though activities that comprise events follow a coherent, regular,
and consistent temporal order. For example, for the event taking money out of an ATM,
you go to the ATM, open your purse or wallet, take out your bank card, insert your bank
card into the machine, type in your personal identification number, and so on until you
put away your bank card and cash. Because of the strength of this intuition about order-
ing, the theoretical idea that event representations are composed of a consistent linear
sequence of activities has a strong appeal. In fact, it has led to theories in which event
representations correspond to linked linear chains of activity nodes in the mind (Barsalou
& Sewell, 1985; Drummer, van der Meer, & Schaadt, 2016).
However, there are difficult challenges in understanding the ways in which an event’s
temporal organization plays a role in its representation and access. The event cognition
literature has not been free of empirical controversy, in the sense that divergent findings
have been reported regarding both the form and use of event knowledge. One major con-
troversy hinges on the extent to which the temporal structure of events is encoded in
long-term memory. This might seem like an odd thing to question, given the recurring
theme of events as sequentially structured activity sequences. Indeed, there is evidence
for linear chain-like temporal representations of events in memory (Barsalou & Sewell,
1985; Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Coll-Florit & Gennari, 2011; Drummer, van der
Meer, & Schaadt, 2016; Lancaster & Barsalou, 1997; Raisig, Welke, Hagendorf, & van
der Meer, 2007; van der Meer, Beyer, Heinze, & Badel, 2002; Zwaan, 1996). Further-
more, the literature on linguistic aspect reveals a fine-grained sensitivity to the temporal
contour of events (Becker, Ferretti, & Madden-Lombardi, 2013; Brennan & Pylkk€anen,
2008; Paczynski, Jackendoff, & Kuperberg, 2014; Pi~nango, Zurif, & Jackendoff, 1999;
Todorova, Straub, Badecker, & Frank, 2000).
The notion that an event’s temporal organization is directly mirrored in its representa-
tion and access has been challenged by studies that failed to find evidence that the tempo-
ral structure of events is encoded in a strict chain-like manner in long-term memory
(Galambos & Rips, 1982). These data come from experiments in which participants make
judgments about an event’s activities. They test the hypothesis that if sequential order is
the dominant (sole) organizing principle in the representation of event structure, perfor-
mance should be facilitated in specific ways. For example, Galambos and Rips (1982)
compared predictions of a model in which events are represented as linear chains of
activities versus a hierarchical model. They found no reliable evidence for linear chains
of activities, and concluded that events are not represented solely as linear sequences.
Galambos and Rips did, however, find that centrality (a measure of the importance of an
activity) facilitated access to activities within an event. This is consistent with evidence
of hierarchical encoding of event knowledge that has been found in other studies (Black
& Bower, 1980; Bower et al., 1979).
In hindsight, these contradictory findings concerning people’s sensitivity to the tempo-
ral structure of events may not be that surprising. Although a strong intuition exists that
events are comprised of consistent linear sequences, it may be the case that with respect
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to temporal order, there are multiple sources of variability. For example, there may be a
great deal of variability in the regularity of the temporal order of activities across events
(this was recognized some time ago when a distinction was made between strong and
weak scripts; Abelson, 1981). Some events, like taking money out of an ATM or changing
a flat tire, may be quite consistent and linear. This is related to the fact that one must,
for example, take your card out of your wallet prior to inserting it into the ATM, and
you must perform both of these actions prior to typing your PIN. On the other hand, for
an event like cleaning the house, there are many activities that frequently are part of the
event such as vacuuming and cleaning the toilets, but in general, the activities that com-
prise cleaning the house can be completed in many orders, and in the end, the house will
be clean.
Single instances of real-world events do indeed live in time, and therefore follow a lin-
ear temporal order. However, an event is often interrupted, being intertwined with other
activities and events. For example, consider the set of activities that might comprise mak-
ing pasta for dinner. You get the pasta from the cupboard, get a pot from a kitchen
drawer, put water on the stove to boil, read and answer a text, get the pasta sauce from
the fridge, change the music on your wireless home stereo system, put the pasta in a pot,
break up an argument between your 3- and 5-year-old children, set the table, quickly feed
the dog, and so on. In other words, as people learn about events that are directly experi-
enced, the input often is noisy, fragmented, and variable.
In addition, much of people’s knowledge about events comes from linguistic descrip-
tions of them. Indeed, for learning about many types of events, hearing or reading about
them is the primary source of input because we rarely if ever directly experience them.
Furthermore, linguistic descriptions often play with time. It is well known that spoken
and written descriptions of events do not tend to mirror or respect real time, and language
contains a number of vehicles to signal and warp time. Thus, linguistic descriptions of
events often provide partial, fragmented, and temporally disjointed information about
events. Overall, people’s event knowledge is learned from a huge number of highly vari-
able directly experienced and linguistically described examples.
2. Analyzing event knowledge using graph theory
K. S. Brown, N. Christidis, J. L. Elman, and K. McRae (in preparation) investigated
event structure by representing events as graphs. They conducted a norming study in
which participants produced an ordered set of up to 12 activities for 81 events such as
taking money out of an ATM and cleaning the house (for similar event norms, see Raisig,
Welke, Hagendorf, & van der Meer, 2009; Rosen et al., 2003) Participants typed their
responses, and the study was conducted using Qualtrics with Master’s participants from
Amazon Mechanical Turk. K. S. Brown et al. (in preparation) purposely chose events that
intuitively differed in their temporal extent and the consistency of their temporal struc-
ture. Approximately 25 participants generated activities for each event. The data were
collated to standardize the written descriptions of activities that referred to the same
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activity but were worded slightly differently (e.g., get bank card from wallet and take out
bank card). For some events, there was a high degree of consensus regarding the individ-
ual activities produced and the ordering of sets of activities.
For other events, however, participants’ responses showed a great deal of variability
both in the activities they provided, and the order in which they provided them. No two
participants generated identical sets of activities for any of the events. This variability
most likely results from three sources: (a) variability in the ways in which events unfold;
(b) variability in what people attend to, and find important, in an event (event construal);
and (c) variability in what participants believe should be reported in any given situation,
which can be influenced by what they believe to be mundane or default (and perhaps not
reported), or the perspective that they take when listing activities in terms of providing
detail or the lack of it. We can see evidence for all of these in our data. As to (a), it is
clear that some events can be conducted or construed in multiple ways; participants do
not generally agree (nor should we expect them to) on whether you need to eat before
versus after you play frisbee at a picnic. An extreme example of (b) comes from chang-
ing a flat tire, in which one participant’s activity sequence consisted solely of “call
AAA”. This same event, along with writing an email, shows signs of variability due to
(c) as well, in which some participants listed activities such as “acquire computer,”
whereas most others assumed the presence of one. Despite the presence of language-
based sources of variability, our conclusions that events may be naturally completed in
various ways, and that events exist in the mind as construals, are grounded by the data
and supported by the modeling.
From participants’ generated lists of activities, K. S. Brown et al. (in preparation) cre-
ated a directed, weighted graph for each event. The graphs were constructed by inputting
all sequential pairs of activities in the order in which each individual participant produced
them. Therefore, each graph is an amalgamation of the approximately 25 participants’
activity lists. The resulting graphs clearly demonstrate that the temporal structure of
events is much richer than has typically been assumed. That is, in addition to there being
a great deal of variability across the 81 events, there is substantial variability in temporal
structure within each event.
Figs. 1 and 2 present the graphs for writing an email and shopping for clothes. Activi-
ties (nodes) are depicted as labeled ovals, and an arrow (directed edge) connects each
ordered pair of activities. The darkness and thickness of an arrow from activity A to
activity B is proportional to the number of participants that produced an activity list in
which A directly preceded B. Writing an email (Fig. 1) is a nice example because it con-
tains the least number of unique activities of the 81 normed events (39, making it the
easiest to visualize) and it is an event that intuitively seems that it should be well-defined
in terms of sequential order. The sequence of dark thick arrows shows the generalized
trajectory through this event. On the other hand, even that path is not deterministic. Over-
all, the variability in how writing an email is conducted in the world and/or construed in
the mind is readily apparent in that it does not correspond to a linear chain of activities.
Graph theoretical analyses also may provide empirically based insights into hierarchi-
cal theories in which events are divided into scenes (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Zacks &
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Tversky, 2001). For example, one might imagine that the event changing a flat tire may
be subdivided into four major hierarchically structured scenes (preparation, removing the
flat tire, installing the new tire, finishing up, and driving away). In Figs. 1 and 2, we have
labeled the nodes using an algorithm that maximizes graph modularity. Highly modular
graphs are “clumpy” and consist of groups of nodes more highly connected to each other
than to other groups (Newman & Girvan, 2004). Decomposing a graph into modules or
communities is analogous to clustering high dimensional data. In directed weighted
graphs, communities consist of sets of nodes that are more strongly directionally con-
nected than is expected by chance (Leicht & Newman, 2008). Fig. 1 (writing an email)
shows four primary communities/scenes. Green ovals designate activities that correspond
to the preparatory phase of writing an email. Light blue and purple ovals specify addi-
tional initial phases. The activities in red are the guts of writing an email. Amusingly,
there are the activities in darker blue ovals; one participant apparently thought that writ-
ing an email requires celebrating the small victories in life by drinking a beer and going
into the kitchen (in that order).
Fig. 1. Graph constructed from participants’ produced activities for the event of writing an email.
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These analyses of event structure suggest a reason why studies such as Galambos and
Rips (1982) failed to find evidence for the encoding of temporal structure in event knowl-
edge. For example, one event that they used was changing a flat tire. Galambos and Rips
chose early temporally close activity pairs such as set the brake and take out spare, and
later pairs such as remove bad tire followed by put on spare. They tested the prediction
that if temporal order is encoded in long-term memory for event knowledge, then both
the early and late pairs would be facilitatory as compared to activity pairs that are more
distant in the sequence, such as set the brake and put on spare. However, they found no
such difference.
This null effect may have occurred because of large but uncontrolled differences in the
strength of ordering constraints between nearby activity pairs. In some parts of the
sequence, K. S. Brown et al. (in preparation) graphs show relatively weak links between
activity pairs, and many potential avenues emanating from an activity node. In other
cases, there is a strong edge coming out of a node, and very few nodes to which it links.
In other words, an event’s temporal structure can vary over its time course, and this is
probably the rule rather than the exception. Some componential sequences may be con-
strained strongly, whereas others are constrained weakly (note that this has been explored
to some extent in the AI action planning and recognition literature; Botea, M€uller, &
Schaeffer, 2005; Yi & Ballard, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that finding evidence for
Fig. 2. Graph constructed from participants’ produced activities for the event of shopping for clothes.
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the temporal structure in event knowledge depends crucially on the specific activity pairs
that are used in an experiment. Important factors appear to include the degree to which
the probabilistic strength of their ordering is taken into account when the experiment is
designed and analyzed, and the degree to which the experimental probe is sensitive to
these probabilistic differences among stimuli.
In summary, perhaps the biggest challenge for models of event knowledge is event
variability. The intuition behind frames and scripts was that there are generalizations that
cut across events, and it was the goal of frames and scripts to capture these generaliza-
tions. However, the inconvenient reality is that one may go to a restaurant ten times, or a
thousand times, and that script will never unfold in exactly the same way. Without dis-
puting that there are types of events and generalizations that hold true across them, there
is in reality tremendous variation in how those events are instantiated. Furthermore, the
variation is not random. Some variations are correlated. For example, when you pay for
your meal will depend on whether you are in a fancy restaurant versus a fast food restau-
rant. Whether you eat your salad before or after the main course may depend on the
country in which you are dining. Some elements of events are entirely optional, whereas
other elements may be quite probable. This variation also occurs at the level of temporal
structure. A central conclusion from the graph theoretic analyses is that the temporal
structure of events is rich and variable. One possible interpretation is that it is highly
unlikely that events are represented in the human mind as a sequential linear temporal
order of activities. It therefore appears to be quite challenging to construct a type of rep-
resentation that could explicitly encode the temporal structure inherent in events. A
slightly more radical way to state this is that explicit "event representations" do not exist.
In other words, rather than using a structured representation for each type of event in
long-term memory, it may be the case that the temporal structure of events is an emer-
gent property of a computational system that implicitly represents memory for time in its
processing (see Botvinick & Plaut, 2004).
3. A connectionist attractor model of event knowledge
Elman and McRae (2019) implemented a prediction-based model of event knowledge
to tackle the issues of learning and processing variable, dynamic, temporal event struc-
ture. In the connectionist framework, the architecture underlying cognition involves net-
works of processing units (or nodes). Encoded knowledge is determined by the
connection pattern among units and the learned strengths of weights between units. Thus,
both memory and processing are instantiated in the weights.
The architecture of Elman and McRae’s (2019) model is presented in Fig. 3. Activities
are represented in terms of their components, including actions, agents, patients, recipi-
ents, instruments, and contexts (typically locations). Local representations of these con-
cepts were used. The model was trained on sequences of activities that were not labeled
explicitly as events. Elman and McRae used backpropagation through time (Williams &
Zipser, 1989) to train their attractor network (i.e., the network settled through time). The
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left side of the network receives input from the world about the current activity. These
"current activity" units are fully connected to a set of hidden (computational) units that
feed back to them. These feedback connections allow the model to learn co-occurrences
among the components of activities that occur in the moment. The right side of the net-
work contains the same representational units as does the left side. The hidden units are
unidirectionally connected to these "next activity" units. The purpose of this part of the
network was to learn information about sequential patterns among activities by learning
to predict upcoming activities.
The model processed each activity over four cycles of activation, with each cycle con-
taining four time ticks. During cycles 1 and 2 (8 time ticks), the input was clamped on
the current activity units. Activation flowed throughout the network for all time ticks.
During cycles 3 and 4 (the final 8 time ticks), the input was removed so that the network
was free to instantiate and perhaps complete the pattern on the current activity units, and
to continue to activate the next activity units. During training, error was based on target
activations for both the current and next activity units throughout cycles 3 and 4. Elman
and McRae (2019) showed that when the trained model was given a partially specified
current activity, it probabilistically filled in the activity’s missing components based on
the activities to which it had been exposed (see their fig. 2, p. 260). Thus, the network
implemented pattern completion in the moment, and pattern completion through time
(i.e., prediction). Furthermore, Elman and McRae showed that the model’s predictions are
contextually determined in that what is predicted to occur next depends not only on the
current activity (as it would in a Markov chain), but also on the activities that precede it.
Fig. 3. Elman and McRae (2019) network architecture. Rectangles depict banks of processing units. In the
Current Activity section of the network, the Agent, Action, Patient, Instrument, Context, and Recipient
units are fully bidirectionally connected with the hidden units. In the Next Activity section of the network,
the hidden units are fully unidirectionally connected to the right-hand-side banks of units.
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Also note that Elman and McRae’s model is not a simple recurrent network (SRN, aka
Elman network). An SRN can accomplish some aspects of what Elman and McRae’s
model does, but it is not an attractor network (it is a modified feed-forward network).
Therefore, an SRN does not settle over time, which Elman and McRae wanted their net-
work to do in order to illustrate temporal dynamics during the presentation of each activ-
ity. They also wanted their model to learn the co-occurrences among the components of
the current activity, which an SRN is not designed to do.
One set of simulations conducted by Elman and McRae (2019) involved training a net-
work on the participant-generated sets of activities that were described in Section 2. They
used changing a flat tire and going to a picnic as examples because these events differ
substantially in the degree to which their temporal structure is defined. The model learned
by integrating information about the temporal order of activities and their components
across the participants’ productions. Elman and McRae conducted simulations in which
they treated the network as though it was a participant in the activity production task.
The network was seeded an initial activity, pull car over to side of road. Then, the most
strongly predicted components were used as the next current activity, and so on. The
model produced a completely sensible way of fixing a flat tire (see fig. 15, p. 275, Elman
& McRae). It produced a description of the event that captures both the sequential struc-
ture of the event and also the appropriate elements of each activity. However, it was not
a description that was provided by any of the participants. Instead, the network discov-
ered what might be considered as the core consensus from the descriptions on which it
was trained.
The going to a picnic simulation produced somewhat different results (see fig. 17, p.
277, Elman & McRae). Going to a picnic includes a number of activities that occur with
reasonable frequency, although many are not necessary for having a picnic, and there is a
great deal of optionality in their order (one can eat, play volleyball, and swim in any
order). Because of this variability, the model produced a bare-bones picnic, consisting
basically of getting there, putting out the food, eating the food, sitting, packing up, and
leaving.
These simulations invite a number of conclusions regarding the form of event knowl-
edge and how it is learned. The flexibility and variability in events argue against the idea
that the human mind contains pre-specified event templates, or some type of data struc-
ture that represents events explicitly. Elman and McRae’s (2019) network demonstrates
the value of understanding event knowledge not by pre-specifying what an event is, but
by focusing on how event knowledge might be learned, especially when people are
exposed to variability. One challenge has long been how to know when and under what
circumstances variability should be accommodated, and to what degree.
Finally, prediction turns out to be a powerful mechanism for learning about temporal
structure. This has been known for a while now (Elman, 1990, 1995). However, some
new things were learned from training the connectionist model on human data. Although
any given instance of an event is necessarily linear, from the event norming data, and the
many ways that even the same event can be carried out, we see that events have a much
richer temporal structure than typically has been imagined. The model demonstrates that
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the temporal structure of events in the human mind may emerge as a consequence of pre-
diction-based learning.
4. Conclusions
In this article, we discussed how the temporal structure of real-world events might be
processed in human memory. We argued that there is substantial variability in temporal
structure that occurs across instances of the same general type of event. There also is sub-
stantial variability across types of events in that some may be quite constrained whereas
others may have few constraints on temporal structure. Event-predictive models of cogni-
tion such as those that are based on simple recurrent or attractor networks that feature
prediction-based learning are able to deal with these sources of variability naturally so
that event knowledge emerges.
Prediction is a key focus in this special issue and also has played central role in many
recent models of event knowledge (Frank, Koppen, Noordman, & Vonk, 2003; Mayberry,
Crocker, & Knoeferle, 2009; Modi, 2016; Reynolds et al., 2007; Takac & Knott, 2016a,
2016b; Venhuizen et al., 2019). For example, Reynolds et al. (2007) presented a model
of the perception of event boundaries and the updating of event representations based on
a simple recurrent network (Elman, 1990). Their work used as a starting point research
on how people segment perceptual events (see Zacks & Swallow, 2007, for a review).
Reynolds et al. (2007) showed that a simple recurrent network that was augmented with
a gating mechanism could use prediction error signals to discover event boundaries, and
they demonstrated that prediction error and event boundaries play a role in learning and
updating internal representations of event knowledge. Reynolds et al. concluded that peo-
ple’s experience with repeated patterns in the world allows them to accurately predict
upcoming stimuli within an event. Importantly, people are able to use transient increases
in prediction error to identify boundaries between events (event segmentation), and this
ability results in improved prediction about downstream activities.
Prediction (or expectancy generation) also has played a major role in theories and
empirical investigations of language comprehension for a number of years. Furthermore,
there is a great deal of evidence that people’s event knowledge is a primary source of
information for constructing on-line predictions of upcoming linguistic input (for reviews,
see Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009; Kuperberg & Jaeger, 2016). To simulate event-based pre-
dictive language comprehension, Venhuizen et al. (2019) implemented a simple recurrent
network in which they focused on the interaction between linguistic and real-world event
knowledge. They used a simple recurrent network as the basis of a model that incremen-
tally constructs rich, probabilistic situation model representations word by word. Compre-
hension was simulated by movement through a probabilistic situation (meaning) state
space (Frank et al., 2003). Their model simulated Elman’s (2009) words-as-cues approach
in that each word served as a cue for traversing semantic state space in a context-sensi-
tive manner. Venhuizen et al. showed that their prediction-based model could account for
word surprisal (Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008) by constructing rich probabilistic meaning
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representations that support inferences that are driven by the integration of linguistic and
event knowledge.
Elman and McRae (2019) also presented simulations in which the model displayed
behaviors that have been characterized in human empirical work as demonstrating infer-
encing of unmentioned event components (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994), the pre-
diction of upcoming activities and their components (which may or may not ever occur
or be mentioned; Metusalem et al., 2012), reconstructive memory (Bransford, Barclay, &
Franks, 1972), and the ability to adapt to deviations from previously encountered
sequences of activities. All of these behaviors emerged from the model’s prediction-based
learning mechanism. Note that although Elman and McRae view their network to be a
model of event knowledge rather than of language processing, in these cases, they used it
also to simulate language comprehension experiments because the influence of event
knowledge often has been studied using psycholinguistic experiments. Their model did
not, however, contain any mechanisms for processing, for example, passive sentences, or
sentences such as “Before doing X, they did Y.”
Finally, Takac and Knott (2016a, 2016b; this volume) describe models of the construction
of event representations in working and long-term memory. An intriguing and important
aspect of their modeling, and another way in which these models are tied to language pro-
cessing, is that they tackled the problem of how elements of activities are assigned to roles
such as agent and patient that play key parts in the event cognition literature, the language
comprehension literature, and the event knowledge/language comprehension interface.
4.1. Events as graphs
Finally, we introduced an approach for studying event structure based on graph theory.
We claim that by constructing an event network as an “ensemble” object using activity
sequences from many participants, we arrive at an event description that is abstracted
away from how any particular individual represents that event, while still being able to
accurately capture event variability. This is a theoretical claim and a strong one. How-
ever, as only mentioned here but detailed elsewhere (K. S. Brown et al., in preparation),
this is a falsifiable theory—the graphs make clear, empirically testable predictions, partic-
ularly with regard to activity centrality and the degree to which it is equally or unequally
distributed across the activities in a given event. Moreover, the event graphs do reproduce
a kind of dynamic flexibility. The natural way to generate activity sequences (e.g., predict
the next activity) from the graph is to place a Markov process on the graph that moves
from activity to activity, following directed edges, with probability proportional to edge
strength. This can be done from any starting activity, so it is straightforward to complete
an event after being “dropped into the middle” of it.
4.2. Causality
We end with some comments regarding causality. Humans care deeply about what will
occur next, both in the short and long term. Being able to anticipate what will happen
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provides us with a guide to our own behavior and allows us to predict what others may
do. Sometimes temporal structure is governed by causal structure. Other times, it is the
result of cultural convention or habit. A model such as that of Elman and McRae (2019)
definitely learns key statistical regularities, but it does not learn any explicit notion of
causality (as in knowing that pulling the handle on a toilet causes water to rush through
the bowl). Strong constraints on activity order do of course correlate to some extent with
causal necessity. For example, when taking money out of an ATM, it is necessary to
insert your bank card prior to typing in your personal identification number. (On the other
hand, it may or may not be valid to think that inserting your bank card causes you to
type in your personal identification number.) Furthermore, strong ordering constraints
may reflect strong conventions, rather than causal necessity. Therefore, we view the
model as a mechanism that learns statistical structure concerning the temporal nature of
events, and that those statistics would be useful for humans to discover causality. That is,
we do not suggest that Elman and McRae’s model knows anything about causality per se,
but the ability to learn varying strengths of statistical relationships provides important evi-
dence for people to support an hypothesis that there may be a causal relationship between
two activities. That said, if people learn about event structure using principles similar to
those embodied in this model, then the temporal structure that is learned, including cases
of near-invariant ordering constraints, could provide valuable clues for building theories
of causality.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by Natural Engineering & Sciences Research Council
of Canada Discovery Grant 05652 to Ken McRae. Jeff Elman made huge contribu-
tions to the ideas presented in this article, as well as to our modeling and human
empirical research reviewed herein. Sadly, he passed away before this article was pub-
lished.
References
Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist, 36, 715–729.
Altmann, G. T. M., & Mirkovic, J. (2009). Incrementality and prediction in human sentence processing.
Cognitive Science, 33, 583–609.
Anderson, R. C. (1978). Schema-directed processes in language comprehension. In A. M. Lesgold, J. W.
Pellegrino, S. D. Fokkema, & R. Glaser (Eds.), Cognitive psychology and instruction (pp. 67–82). Boston,
MA: Springer.
Barsalou, L. W. (1983). Ad hoc categories. Memory & Cognition, 11, 211–227.
Barsalou, L. W., & Sewell, D. R. (1985). Contrasting the representation of scripts and categories. Journal of
Memory and Language, 24, 646–665.
Becker, R. B., Ferretti, T. R., & Madden-Lombardi, C. J. (2013). Grammatical aspect, lexical aspect, and
event duration constrain the availability of events in narratives. Cognition, 129, 212–220.
K. McRae, K. S. Brown, J. L. Elman / Topics in Cognitive Science (2019) 15
Black, J. B., & Bower, G. H. (1980). Story understanding as problem-solving. Poetics, 9(1–3), 223–250.
Botea, A., M€uller, M., & Schaeffer, J. (2005). Learning partial-order macros from solutions. In S. Biundo, K.
Myers, & K. Rajan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Automated Planning and
Scheduling (pp. 231–240). Monterey, CA.
Botvinick, M., & Plaut, D. C. (2004). Doing without schema hierarchies: A recurrent connectionist approach
to normal and impaired routine sequential action. Psychological Review, 111, 395–429.
Bower, G. H., Black, J. B., & Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts in memory for text. Cognitive Psychology, 11,
177–220.
Bransford, J. D., Barclay, J. R., & Franks, J. J. (1972). Sentence memory: A constructive versus interpretive
approach. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 193–209.
Brennan, J., & Pylkk€anen, L. (2008). Processing events: Behavioral and neuromagnetic correlates of
aspectual coercion. Brain & Language, 106, 132–143.
Butz, M. V., Bilkey, D., Humaidan, D., Knott, A., & Otte, S. (2019). Learning, planning, and control in a
monolithic neural event inference architecture. Neural Networks, 117, 135–144.
Coll-Florit, M., & Gennari, S. P. (2011). Time in language: Event duration in language comprehension.
Cognitive Psychology, 62, 41–79.
Drummer, J., van der Meer, E., & Schaadt, G. (2016). Event-related potentials in response to violations of
content and temporal event knowledge. Neuropsychologia, 80, 47–55.
Elman, J. L. (1990). Finding structure in time. Cognitive Science, 14, 179–211.
Elman, J. L. (1995). Language as a dynamical system. In R. F. Port & T. van Gelder (Eds.), Mind as motion:
Explorations in the dynamics of cognition (pp. 195–223). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Elman, J. L. (2009). On the meaning of words and dinosaur bones: Lexical knowledge without a lexicon.
Cognitive Science, 33, 547–582.
Elman, J. L., & McRae, K. (2019). A model of event knowledge. Psychological Review, 126, 252–291.
Frank, S. L., Koppen, M., Noordman, L. G., & Vonk, W. (2003). Modeling knowledge-based inferences in
story comprehension. Cognitive Science, 27, 875–910.
Galambos, J. A., & Rips, L. J. (1982). Memory for routines. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior, 21, 260–281.
Ghosh, V. E., & Gilboa, A. (2014). What is a memory schema? A historical perspective on current
neuroscience literature. Neuropsychologia, 53, 104–114.
Graesser, A. C., Singer, M., & Trabasso, T. (1994). Constructing inferences during narrative text
comprehension. Psychological Review, 101, 371–395.
Hale, J. T. (2001). A probabilistic Earley parser as a psycholinguistic model. Proceedings of the second
meeting of the North American chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics on Language
Technologies (pp. 1–8). Stroudsburg, PA: Association for Computational Linguistics.
Kuperberg, G. R., & Jaeger, T. F. (2016). What do we mean by prediction in language comprehension?
Language, Cognition, & Neuroscience, 31, 32–59.
Lancaster, J. S., & Barsalou, L. W. (1997). Multiple organisations of events in memory. Memory, 5, 569–
599.
Leicht, E. A., & Newman, M. E. J. (2008). Community structure in directed networks. Physical Review
Letters, 100, 118703.
Levy, R. (2008). Expectation-based syntactic comprehension. Cognition, 106, 1126–1177.
Mandler, J. M. (1984). Scripts, stories and scenes: Aspects of schema theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mayberry, M. R., Crocker, M. W., & Knoeferle, P. (2009). Learning to attend: A connectionist model of
situated language comprehension. Cognitive Science, 33, 449–496.
Metusalem, R., Kutas, M., Urbach, T. P., Hare, M., McRae, K., & Elman, J. L. (2012). Generalized event
knowledge activation during online sentence comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 66, 545–
567.
Minsky, M. (1974). A framework for representing knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
16 K. McRae, K. S. Brown, J. L. Elman / Topics in Cognitive Science (2019)
Modi, A. (2016). Event embeddings for semantic script modeling. In Y. Goldberg & D. Riezler (Eds.),
Proceedings of the Conference on Computational Natural Language Learning (CoNLL) (pp. 75–83).
Berlin, Germany: Association for Computational Linguistics.
Murphy, G. (2002). The big book of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Newman, M. E. J., & Girvan, M. (2004). Finding and evaluating community structure in netwoks. Physical
Review E, 69, 026113.
Norman, D. A., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1981). The LNR approach to human information processing. Cognition,
10, 235–240.
Paczynski, M., Jackendoff, R., & Kuperberg, G. (2014). When events change their nature: The
neurocognitive mechanisms underlying aspectual coercion. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 26, 1905–
1917.
Pi~nango, M. M., Zurif, E., & Jackendoff, R. (1999). Real-time processing implications of enriched
composition at the syntax–semantics interface. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 28, 395–414.
Raisig, S., Welke, T., Hagendorf, H., & van der Meer, E. (2007). Investigating dimensional organization in
scripts using the pupillary response. Psychophysiology, 44, 864–873.
Raisig, S., Welke, T., Hagendorf, H., & Van Der Meer, E. (2009). Insights into knowledge representation:
The influence of amodal and perceptual variables on event knowledge retrieval from memory. Cognitive
Science, 33, 1252–1266.
Reynolds, J. R., Zacks, J. M., & Braver, T. S. (2007). A computational model of event segmentation from
perceptual prediction. Cognitive Science, 31, 613–643.
Rosen, V. M., Caplan, L., Sheesley, L., Rodriguez, R., & Grafman, J. (2003). An examination of daily
activities and their scripts across the adult lifespan. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, &
Computers, 35, 32–48.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. Spiro, B. Bruce, & W. Brewer
(Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension (pp. 33–58). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Schank, R. C. (1980). Language and memory. Cognitive Science, 4, 243–284.
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding: An inquiry into human
knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Takac, M., & Knott, A. (2016a).Mechanisms for storing and accessing event representations in episodic
memory, and their expression in language: A neural network model. In A. Papafragou, D. Grodner, D.
Mirman, & J. C. Trueswell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science
Society (pp. 532–537). Austin TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Takac, M., & Knott, A. (2016b).Working memory encoding of events and their participants: A neural
network model with applications in sensorimotor processing and sentence generation. In A. Papafragou,
D. Grodner, D. Mirman, & J. C. Trueswell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the
Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2345–2350). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Todorova, M., Straub, K., Badecker, W., & Frank, R. (2000). Aspectual coercion and the online computation
of sentential aspect. In L. R. Gleitman, & A. K. Joshi (Eds.), Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Meeting of
the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 523–528). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Van Der Meer, E., Beyer, R., Heinze, B., & Badel, I. (2002). Temporal order relations in language
comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28, 770.
Venhuizen, N., Crocker, M. W., & Brouwer, H. (2019). Expectation-based Comprehension: Modeling the
interaction of world knowledge and linguistic experience. Discourse Processes, 56, 229–255.
Williams, R. J., & Zipser, D. (1989). A learning algorithm for continually running fully recurrent neural
networks. Neural Computation, 1, 270–280.
Yi, W., & Ballard, D. (2009). Recognizing behavior in hand-eye coordination patterns. International Journal
of Humanoid Robotics, 6, 337–359.
Zacks, J. M., & Swallow, K. M. (2007). Event segmentation. Current Directions in Psychological Science,
16, 80–84.
K. McRae, K. S. Brown, J. L. Elman / Topics in Cognitive Science (2019) 17
Zacks, J. M., & Tversky, B. (2001). Event structure in perception and conception. Psychological Bulletin,
127, 3.
Zwaan, R. A. (1996). Processing narrative time shifts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning
Memory, & Cognition, 22, 1196–1207.
Zwaan, R. A., & Radvansky, G. A. (1998). Situation models in language comprehension and memory.
Psychological Bulletin, 123, 162–185.
18 K. McRae, K. S. Brown, J. L. Elman / Topics in Cognitive Science (2019)
